9 August 2014
Introduction to Game Theory
This course will serve as an introduction to game theory, aimed at students who have little or no experience in the subject. We will develop the theory of choice, the theory of choice under
uncertainty, and non-cooperative game theory. Specific concepts that will be covered include:
preferences and utility, expected utility, games in normal form, games in extensive form (including models of bargaining and repeated games) and games of incomplete information. If time permits, we will review topics in social choice. Applications will be drawn from comparative politics and international relations. By the end of the course, you will have a sufficient foundation to appreciate basic game-theoretic research in politics.
It is essential that you are fluent in basic calculus and algebra. This includes elementary techniques of differentiation, and solving a set of simultaneous equation. If you are rusty, now is a good time to revisit these topics. For calculus, excellent and inexpensive practice material can be found in Schaum’s Outline of Calculus, which contains a plethora of questions with fully worked out solutions. For algebra practice, any decent high school text will be sufficient.
To obtain the full five ECTS credits available, participants must complete their course, which includes a project assignment and an exam, on 9 August 2014. Participants who do not sit the exam can still obtain three ECTS credits by completing the project assignment. Participants who sit the exam but choose not to complete the project assignment can obtain two ECTS credits.
EUR 925: ECPR member
EUR 1250: ECPR non-member